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THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
1787 : 1937
IN this year of grace, 1937, and the one hundred-fiftieth
since the Constitution went forth to the States seeking
adoption by the people as their fundamental law, it seems
fitting to pay tribute to it as a living Constitution. In 1835
De Tocqueville wrote:
"The Supreme Court is placed at the head of all known tribunals,
both by the nature of its rights and the class of justiciable parties
which it controls. The peace, prosperity and very existence of the Union
are placed in the hands of judges."
When De Tocqueville wrote this a century ago, the Su-
preme Court had only once pronounced upon a law of Con-
gress. This was in the Marbury case in 1803. The national-
izing tendency and the "expounding" by Marshall, or the
relation of the Court to the federal system, seem to have
been the main thoughts in De Tocqueville's mind. In 1937,
Professor Henry W. Edgerton, of the Cornell University Law
School, writing in the Cornell Law Quarterly' on The Inci-
dence of Judicial Control Over Congress, gives a detailed
1 12 CoRN. L. Q. 137. The author states: "I am concerned only with the prac-
tical effects and tendencies of the nullifying decisions . . . This paper . . .
deals for the most part with direction rather than distance . . . It is not a study
of the Court, but of one of its functions."
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and informing study of the actual effects of judicial review.
By the clear light of Professor Edgerton's study it is evident
there is need of revising much of our constitutional history.
However this may be, to this day the great De Tocqueville's
words stand; and, in interpreting the Constitution under the
principle of judicial review, the Court has given evidence in
a socio-economic age that the organic law under which we
live is not an abstract thing. It has become a living letter
governing actions and determining positive relations among
men. In this our day a Cardozo on the bench makes clear
that the courts must be furnished with available data on
human relationships involved in cases before them, in order
to arrive at wise conclusions; and that "some of the errors
of the courts have their origin in imperfect knowledge of the
economic and social needs to which a decision will respond."
Thus, an economic interpretation of the Constitution admits
of the deduction that the law has no reality when separated
from social and economic factors by which it is in part condi-
tioned and in turn helps to condition.2 Under an economic
interpretation of the Constitution by the Court, the legalistic
method is said to break down; and though the Court applies
legal rules of construction, these rules admit of contradic-
tions. These contradictions are pointed out by Professor Ran-
dall, of the University of Illinois. He asks: "What has be-
For a new interpretation of Marshall's doctrine on judicial review in the Mar-
bury case, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), see BowERs, JEFFERSON'S POWERS, most especially
pp. 168ff.
2 See BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 12. See, also (when it appears), MCCARTHY, THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION, AN HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.
Many of the late cases since 1933 stress the economic factor. Home Loan Asso-
ciation v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293
U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495,
97 A. L. R. 947 (1935); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Company,
295 U. S. 330 (1935) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U. S. 238 (1936) ; Nation-
al Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, No. 419, 301 U. S.
1, 108 A. L. R. 1352 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936); Norman
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Company, 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Rathbun v. United States,
295 U. S. 602 (1935); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288
(1936); Helvering v. Davis, No. 910.
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come of the Court's rule of Construction?" And answers:I
"When one reads the hundreds of pertinent cases involved in pur-
suing this inquiry he finds that the adjustment of certain practical in-
terests-it may be those of a bank or a steamship company or a grain
elevator corporation or a railroad - and the safeguarding of public
interest in connection with these adjustments, have induced a modifica-
tion here and a restatement there until the Court's rules have been
flattened into broad doctrines that permit an expansive and flexible
interpretation. The Court says in sweeping phrase that the Constitution
must be construed as to promote its broad purposes. It deals in general
language and must not be given the literal interpretation suitable to a
legal code. While enumerating the powers of Congress, it does not at-
tempt to define them. To state the meaning of any one of the enu-
merated power is judicial function to be performed in the light of reason.
Thus the Court struggling with its task of applying this and that part
of the Constitution, is led by the continual modification of its rules of
construction to a situation in which almost no line of interpretation is
absolutely fixed; for at all points the Court reserves to itself a large
freedom of judgment in attuning its decisions to changing conditions
of society. The very process of finding solutions for 'legal questions' in
a practical world leads to their social and economic relationships."
The highest tribunal not infrequently overrules its own
decisions, modifying its rules of construction by the light of
a changing society. An example of this is found in the ruling
of the Court in Farmers' Loan & Trust Company v. Minne-
sota, decided in 1930,' which overruled a case decided twen-
ty-five years earlier - Blackstone v. Miller' In the case of
Blackstone v. Miller the Court sustained an assessment tax
by the State of New York upon the transfer of credits de-
clared to have taxable situs within the bordes of the State
of New York under the will of a citizen of the State of Illi-
nois. This ruling in 1903 supported double taxation of in-
tangibles. In 1930, in Farmers Loan & Trust Company v.
State of Minnesota, it was held that, in general, intangible
property may be properly taxed at the domicile of the owner
and should enjoy immunity against taxation at more than
3 Randall, Interrelation of Social and Constitutional History, 35 AM. HiST.
REv., pp. 1-13.
4 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
5 188 U. §. 189 (1903).
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one place,' similar to that immunity accorded tangibles.'
This ruling rested on the fact that by 1930 the country had
reached a complex socio-economic stage in its development
and that under those conditions intangible property had be-
come a source of revenue to the states. Double taxation was
therefore burdensome. The Court said primitive conditions
had passed; business was at the time transacted on a na-
tional scale; that a very large part of the country's wealth
was invested in negotiable securities whose protection against
discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxation, was a matter
of the greatest moment. Thus, while in the opening decade
of the twentieth century the Court had held that double tax-
ation of intangibles by the states was not contrary to the due
process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; by the
third decade of the century it construed the due process
clause to protect intangible property because of the changes
in economic conditions.
Overruling at times its own decisions and modifying its
rules of construction, the Court thereby asserts that the or-
ganic law must be construed as an expression of organic so-
ciety. Since the Constitution is an expression of the living
organism of society it cannot be fettered by precedent in the
same way as can private law. It would thus appear that the
rule of stare decisis is to be little relied upon in the domain
of constitutional law. From this it is to be deduced that, in
6 To the time of this ruling in 1930, a fiction indulged in had been that in the
instance of intangible property, the situs is where the owner is, mobilia sequunter
personam. The question raised was, "Where is the owner?" In the Farmers' Loan
& Trust Company case, Note 4 supra, the Supreme Court pointed out in its opin-
ion that there would be four theories of situs of intangible property: (1) The dom-
icile of the owner; (2) The domicile of the debtor; (3) The place where the evi-
dences of indebtedness were to be seen; (4) The place where the owner had caused
the property to become an integral part of the localized business. With each state
free to adopt any one of the four theories as the situs of intangibles, it would be
clear that the same property could be taxed at four places at the same time.
7 Accorded tangibles in Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925). In this
case it was held that a state statute that required stocks in corporations in other
states to be included at full value in assessing a transfer tax without deducting the
tax paid to those states, deprived the owner of property without due process of
law in view of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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our present complex social and economic living the task of
the Court interpreting and construing the organic law is not
light. Professor Frankfurter states that this task is uncom-
monly heavy, namely, the "task of legal logic, of penetrating
insight, of balanced judgment, of inventions of formulas of
democratic justice working," as today, "under the pressure
of unscrupulous . . . economic interests in a period when
economic, social and class origins and implications of law
and justice are scrutinized and challenged as never before." 8
The noted jurist, Charles Warren,9 asserts that a great duty
counsel owes to the Court is "to insist that the doctrine of
stare decisis can never be properly applied to decisions upon
constitutional questions"; 10 he holds with other legal think-
ers that "however the Court may interpret the Constitution
it is still the Constitution which is the law and not the deci-
sion of the Court; that to the decision of an underlying ques-
tion of constitutional law no finality attaches; that to endure
it must be right." Hence "any citizen whose liberty or prop-
erty is at stake has an absolute right to appear before the
Court and challenge its interpretations of the Constitution, no
matter how often they may have been promulgated, upon the
ground that they are repugnant to its provisions." Another
contemporary constitutional authority states this constitu-
tional right thus: "A decision of the Court is res adjudicata
only in respect of parties involved in the particular action.1
It is binding upon no others. The decision of the Court on
constitutional questions is not the law. The Constitution
8 Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 39 HAv. L. REv.
(1916).
B 2 WARREN, THE SUPRE-ME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 749.
10 For sidelights on the doctrine of stare decisis, see Boudon, The Problem of
Stare Decisis In Our Constitutional Theory, 8 N. Y. L. Q. REV. (1931); Chamber-
lain: The Doctrine of Stare Decisis As Applied To Decisions of Constitutional
Questions, 3 HARV. L. REV. (1889).
11 See: The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920). In these cases
the Eighteenth Amendment was held valid. A dissenting state which had not been
a party to an action involving the validity of that Amendment could and did raise
the issue anew, compelling the Court to hear its argument. For a complete treat-
ment of the constitutional right herein quoted, see Stevenson, The Eighteenth
Amendment, A Violation of the Constitution, 28 Current History (July, 1928).
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whence the Court derives its power is the law." In this intri-
cacy of judicial interpretation and construction, and in view
of a shifting from legal justice to social justice in a capital-
istic age, Dean Pound observed: "In periods in which the law
is growing . . . it is of the greatest consequence that juristic
and judicial thinking be touched with the best lay thought
of the time." 1" It is conceded so to have been touched; and
continues to be. The professional public in this our day who
are constitutionally-minded, readily admits that our great
Justices on the Supreme Bench of the land are men "thor-
oughly alive to the necessity of intellectual contact with new
conditions 3 and theories."
A noted legalist is quoted saying that something like 'so-
ciological interpretation' began in this country and a pro-
gressive liberalization in the Supreme Court's decisions was
manifested after 1905." 4 The Court often asserts that the
12 Pound, The New Philosophies of the Law, 28 HARV. L. REv. (1914).
13 The Supreme Court makes decisions, not by unanimous concurrence of all
the justices, but by an alignment in so-called Conservative and Liberal grouping.
It is a question how these alignments should be described. Conservatives are some-
times viewed as defending capitalistic, or so-called 'property' rights, or the as-
sumed rights to exhorbitant profits, excessively high rates of interest, a holding of
a preponderance of industrial power, all at the sacrifice of the wage earner who
belongs to the weaker economic group. Property rights doctrine grew out of the
theory of economic individualism in 18th century industrial England, where under
laissez-faire theory it was held that it was immoral for the state to interfere with
man's 'natural right' to make money any way he could under "liberty of con-
tract." Liberals are supposed to champion the 'human rights' of the worker, depriv-
ing him through social law, if need be, of his pathetically so-called liberty of con-
tract with his employer; giving him law-regulated hours, good conditions of labor,
and a living wage. The line of demarcation between Liberals and Conservatives on
the Supreme Bench appears to lie in the degree of tolerance either is willing to
extend to legislative enactments. Professor Cushman has remarked that Justice
Holmes was a Liberal in the sense that he was willing to let the legislatures make
more mistakes than the rest of the justices, and that he did not regard it his busi-
ness to interfere nearly so quickly as his brethren, on the bench.
14 The historian, interested in this turn by the Court toward a sociological
interpretation of the Constitution, looks for the cause of an effect, so manifested.
The cause lies back in the beginnings of the capitalist system in this country. After
the War of 1812 through the years to 1873, laissez faire doctrine prevailed. The
common law fellow-servant and assumption-of-risk theories held in the relation of
employee to employer. The Civil War came in 1861. In its wake after 1865 the
country was swept by an economic and industrial revolution. There was large-scale
production based on huge capital; railroads cut across state lines and linked mar-
kets from coast to coast; there was the abiding presence of a capitalist class and a
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Constitution must be construed as an expression of organic
society; that it must not be given a literal interpretation
suitable to a legal code. The Court's sociological interpreta-
tion of the Constitution and the judicial attitude toward the
question of the validity of social and economic legislation are
strikingly set forth in the following cases:
In the early twentieth century the New York State legisla-
ture passed a labor statute limiting the hours of work of bak-
ery employees. The law was passed on the assumption that
confining conditions in that industry were of such a nature
as to justify State intervention in behalf of employees. In
wage-earner class. Necessity for "invention of formulas of democratic justice" in a
pulsating industrial age found its underlying cause in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868. In view of the "privileges and immuni-
ties clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment the Court for the first time interpreted
that Amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 1873. The Court in its majority
opinion forecast that probably rarely if ever would the due process clause be in-
voked except to protect the Negro, for whom, it judged, the clause was primarily
adopted. At the same time the Court held that the due process clause was not a
limitation on the police power of the States. Prior to this ruling the states had not
dreamed of confronting laissez faire, (in the relations between employer and em-
ployee) with a general welfare program that would embody social legislation passed
by the states in favor of labor over against capital. But after the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 1873, States passed social laws regulating hours; conditions of labor. Capital
viewed such favoring of a special class, Labor, as an interference with its property
right of liberty of contract. Over against the states, socially-minded, Capital begged
the state courts to pronounce upon such laws in view of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This state courts did not do until after the argument
by Roscoe Conkling in a tax case for a railroad company before the Supreme Court
in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific Railway Co., 116 U. S. 138. This great
corporation lawyer proved with documentary evidence that the due process clause
was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to protect not alone the freed man
but every person in his property. From his argument before the Court it was clear
that the states had not only disturbed by statutes the relations of laissez faire be-
tween employer and employee, but had passed menacing and arbitrary tax laws,
and when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted individuals and corporations
were appealing to congressional protection against State and local confiscatory tax
laws. Pressure thus brought upon the Court in a capitalistic age-ultimately that
tribunal, much to the wish of capitalistic classes seeking security in their property-
held that the Fourteenth Amendment did impose judicially enforceable restrictions
on social legislation passed by the States. The state courts, thereafter besieged by
Capital to void such laws, appeared willing in most instances to be of a mind to
do so: "Reacting to the problems that arose in the light of the background of their
legal training, prevalent at the time, and economically individualistic in character."
This individualistic interpretation of the due process of law found a principle to
rest upon in the doctrine of "liberty of contract". As to the Supreme Court's atti-
tude toward social laws, great outstanding rulings treated supra will reveal.
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Lochner v. New York, decided in 1905,"5 a majority on the
Court ruled the statute unconstitutional in view of liberty of
contract under the due process of law clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The decision, of course, was in favor of
the employer, supporting him, under "State, Let-Alone" the-
ory over against the general-welfare doctrine for the em-
ployee. In dissenting opinion Justice Holmes satirized the
ruling in the Lochner case. "The Fourteenth Amendment did
not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," he contended;
and "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economi theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez
faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views,
and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and
familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying
them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."
Subsequent to the Lochner ruling the Court, through legal
briefs, became more informed of the economic and social
conditions which State legislatures were attempting to reg-
ulate through social legislation, and it came about that the
Court sustained two Oregon statutes regulating hours of
labor for industrial employees. 6
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital, or the so-called Mini-
mum Wage Law Case, decided in 1923, the Court in a five-
to-four decision retreating from the liberal position it had
taken toward social laws in the two Oregon labor law cases
took a conservative attitude similar to that taken in the
Lochner case in 1905. In the Adkins case a minimum wage
statute for women and children in the District of Columbia
was held unconstitutional in view of liberty of contract under
the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment. Prior
15 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
16 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908) (sustaining a ten-hour law for
women) ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917) (upholding a ten-hour statute
covering all industrial employees).
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to the ruling in the Adkins case, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington upheld a minimum wage law of that State, and Wash-
ington Court refused to regard the ruling in the Adkins case
as determinative. The Washington Court, moreover, de-
manded the Supreme Court of the United States to re-exam-
ine the Adkins case. The Supreme Court deemed that a re-
examination of the case was not only appropriate but imper-
ative, in view of economic conditions which had supervened,
by the light of which conditions, the Court said, the reason-
ableness of the states' protective power merited considera-
tion. After reconsideration of it the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Adkins case should be, and is, overruled, sus-
taining at the same time the Washington minimum wage law
for women and minors. This was in a decision that was
handed down on March 29, 1937.1" The opinion in this case
gave evidence of the highest tribunal's intellectual contact
with existing conditions in our technically-wrought industrial
society of today. The Court said in part:
"Reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of the State
through the enactment of minimum wage laws, must be determined in
the light of economic conditions; and in view of the fact that exploita-
tion of a class of workers casts direct burden for their support on the
community, the community may direct its lawmaking power to correct
the abuse which springs from the employers' selfish disregard of public
interest. Liberty safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment is liberty
in a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the health, safety, and welfare of the people."
In conclusion, De Tocqueville's words are recalled: With-
out the active cooperation of the Court "the Constitution
would be a dead letter." In view of the foregoing commen-
taries on the Court, the Constitution has become, indeed; a
living letter. In the shifting from legal justice to social jus-
17 Adkins v. Children's Hospital (Minimum Wage Law Case), 261 U. S. 525
(1923); West Hotel Company v. Parrish (the Washington State Minimum Wage
Law Case), 57 S. Ct. 579 (1937), overruling the Adkins case.
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tice over these thirty-odd years of the twentieth century, the
organic law is said to have come down to the market-place.
In this, its magnificent descent, it was said: "To an ever-
increasing audience it became apparent that the law is mere-
ly a form of social and economic expression, changing with
the technology and processes of society and to be understood
in connection with the living tissue of which it is a part." 18
Sister Mary Barbara McCarthy, S. S. J.
Nazareth College, Michigan.
18 2 BEARD, RISE OF AmERICAN CIVILIZATION 762.
